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Introduction 
Compared with the rest of the 
United Kingdom, Wales’ rural 
areas are more important, 
and also quite markedly 
different. One feature of this 
divergence is that forty years 
of European Union 
membership have left Wales 
ill-prepared for detachment 
from the restrictive 
framework of its 
supranational territorial 
policies. Devolution did offer 
scope for the spatially 
sensitive strategies that 
would have promoted 
progress on rural 
development in Wales, as 
Bristow (2000) argued 
almost two decades ago. Yet 
there has been a lack of 
advance in this direction. 
Blame can be partly attached 
to the way in which the 
Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) has evolved, 
especially its Second Pillar. 
Partly, also, much of this 
framework has only weakly 
affected the real lives of rural 
people, whereas policy 
inadequacy in areas such as 
transport, planning and 
taxation has been more 
influential.  
While there will be a new 
range of uncertainties to deal 
with, during and after exit 
from the EU, the opportunity 
to establish a better 
integration of public action to 
support and nurture rural 
development should not be 
wasted. The CAP has aimed 
at a notional EU average, 
and especially after EU 
expansion, is not and indeed 
never has been a viable 
framework for any actual 
existing member state. With 
mounting problems, layer 
upon layer of additions, 
modifications and constraints 
have been superimposed, 
none of which alleviated the 
inherent failure of its 
financial, spatial and 
environmental dimensions, 
and many of which made its 
problems worse.  
This article examines a few 
lessons that should have 
been learned about rural 
development policy, and 
speculates about possible 
directions for its future 
development. It begins by 
deconstructing some potent 
myths about rural 
development that act as 
barriers to achieving spatial 
justice in Wales. Discussion 
then turns to how to establish 
more nuanced principles for 
policy development and 
possible choices for 
implementation beyond 
2019.  
Four potent myths 
The first myth that should be 
tackled is the (often held, 
mostly subconscious) idea 
that a rural economy exists in 
a somehow tangible form, as 
if it were a discrete, though 
smaller, version of regional 
economies such as Scotland, 
or Greater London. 
Abolishing this myth requires 
argument based on the 
branch of economics 
concerned with input-output 
relationships. This has the 
basic premise that a change 
in demand for the final 
outputs of an economic 
system will cause a ripple 
effect, stimulating further 
changes in outputs of the 
upper branches of vertically 
linked industries. For 
example, a change in 
demand for milk will affect 
dairy farmers’ demands for 
inputs of power, feed, 
fertiliser; and each of these 
would in turn affect their 
demand for inputs 
(Richardson, 1985). It is also 
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possible to identify forward 
linkages (Papadas and Dahl, 
1999), where a supply 
source of raw material is 
altered by a positive or 
negative shock, affecting 
downstream industries. 
Continuing the example, the 
availability of more milk 
requires more processing, 
storage and distribution 
capacity, and vice-versa.  
However, this process is 
limited by spatial scale. 
Some outputs are sold 
outside of the spatial 
economic system being 
considered, and proportions 
of various inputs are also 
sourced externally. The 
consequence of these 
leakages depends on the 
relative size of the region or 
area, so that national, 
regional and local 
economies, exert 
respectively weaker 
multiplier effects. At the level 
of the rural locality there are 
virtually no intra-rural 
linkages at all, making rural 
households and businesses 
de facto unique satellites of 
external adjacent urban 
economies. In fact, there is 
no single rural economy, as 
Harrison-Mayfield (1996) 
found. Nor, either, are there 
myriad local rural economies. 
Courtney et al. (2007) have 
demonstrated that, without 
including small rural towns in 
an analysis, input-output 
multipliers have negligible 
effect. 
This has importance beyond 
mere academic sophistry. If 
rural-urban transaction 
relationships are regarded as 
more substantial and 
coherent than they really are, 
then policy errors will result. 
These will be compounded 
when combined with the 
second myth, that agriculture 
is the ‘backbone’ of the rural 
economy (e.g. Jones and 
Patterson, 2013). On a trivial 
level, if the first myth is untrue 
then clearly the farm sector 
can play no role in something 
that does not exist. However, 
the myth itself, and its 
origins, deserve more 
discussion. It has arisen as a 
response by the land lobby to 
the declining share of 
agricultural value added and 
the jobs that depend on it, to 
indicate that, through its 
multiplier linkages, it is more 
important than its direct 
measurement suggests.  
It is surprising how potent 
this myth is, despite evidence 
to the contrary. For example, 
Bateman et al. (1991) 
calculated that even in the 
most remote rural areas of 
Wales, less than 15% of total 
employment was attributable 
to farming when direct, 
indirect and induced effects 
are included. Elsewhere the 
effects were even weaker. 
Even that benchmark should 
be treated with scepticism, 
for a couple of reasons.  At 
the time they were made, 
these multiplier 
measurements 
overestimated impacts 
because of the simplifying 
assumptions involved 
(elastic supply, linear 
proportional production 
functions), but in the 
intervening period, 
centralisation and spatial 
concentration will have 
further diminished them. The 
agricultural sector does 
indeed exert some overall 
regional effects (Midmore, 
1993), but the proportion that 
stays within a rural area is 
limited. Evidence of bi-
regional rural-urban systems 
(Espinosa et al., 2014) 
shows pronounced leakages: 
the effects of agriculture and 
the CAP spending it has 
attracted were insignificant. 
In the United States, 
observed rural multiplier 
effects have been compared 
with model-based  
predictedions. Kilkenny and 
Partridge’s (2009) review 
shows that, rather than an 
anticipated positive impact, 
the outturn is in some cases 
negative (i.e. the value of the 
impact multiplier is less than 
unity). Bizarrely, in some 
cases at least, developments 
intended to stimulate 
economic activity in rural 
areas have led to its decline. 
The last two myths are 
opposing facets related to a 
single issue. One asserts 
that rural areas suffer from 
significant spatial inequality 
(e.g. National Assembly for 
Wales, 2008); the other 
contends that rural 
populations’ location 
decisions are voluntary, 
based on significant wealth 
and attraction to the amenity 
that rural life offers (e.g. 
Welsh Government, 2008). 
Pateman, for example, 
noted, “… it is difficult with 
the available data to assess 
whether rural-urban 
differences represent 
genuine free choices in 
lifestyles, or traps that make 
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it difficult to live how one 
would like” (2011: 72). The 
reality is more complicated, 
since not only are both 
aspects of the myth to an 
extent simultaneously true, 
but their interaction also 
produces outcomes that are 
hard to detect. Statistical 
evidence, as constructed for 
example in the Wales Index 
of Multiple Deprivation 
(Welsh Government, 2015; 
Williams and Doyle, 2016) is 
inadequate, since it fails to 
fully grasp the extent of rural 
disadvantage due to sparsity 
and heterogeneity of the 
population of rural areas. 
Guinjoan et al. (2016) 
contend that this problem 
stems, at least in part, from 
existing definitions of rural 
development that focus on 
inter- rather than intra-spatial 
equity. Average economic, 
social and cultural conditions 
and quality of life of the 
resident population often 
compare favourably with the 
whole of society. Rural 
people are healthier, live 
longer, have better life 
satisfaction on average than 
their urban counterparts 
(Sørensen, 2014). However, 
if rural development is a 
process by which all rural 
residents have the 
opportunity to achieve a 
material and cultural life 
broadly equivalent to that of 
the urban populations, and 
the two contradictory variants 
of the third myth can at least 
in some contexts be 
concurrently valid, it would 
be logically impossible for 
intervention based on the 
former myth not to adversely 
affect those affected by the 
latter, and vice-versa.  
Rural development and 
public policies 
The Second Pillar of the 
CAP, misleadingly also titled 
the Rural Development 
Programme, devotes the 
main (and in Wales the 
largest) part of its resources 
to payments to farmers 
through agri-environment 
schemes. The rest of rural 
development policy is mostly 
focused on infrastructure, 
with the rationale of 
improving rural growth 
potential and thereby raising 
employment and incomes. 
Historically, the balance of 
policy has favoured hard 
transport and industrial 
infrastructures, lowering 
haulage costs and providing 
opportunities for urban 
investors to create 
employment, to promote 
more balanced territorial 
development. This 
characterised the approach 
of the Development Board for 
Rural Wales, and also that of 
the Welsh Development 
Agency, both before and 
after its merger with the 
former (Hughes, 1998). More 
recently, priority has been 
given to digital 
communications 
infrastructures, in pursuit of 
‘smart’ rural development 
(Naldi et al., 2015) allowing 
for distributed patterns of 
working that exploit   
knowledge economy and 
digital technology skills. 
Public support for both hard 
and soft infrastructure is still 
in evidence, although it now 
has a contemporary smart 
specialisation flavouring that 
tries to utilise the 
combination of local 
amenities, creative 
economies and specialized 
links to urban supply and 
demand. As well as for 
residents, these facets 
provide potential 
encouragement for in-
migrating entrepreneurs. 
However, the augmentation 
of both physical and virtual 
communications has had an 
unforeseen effect of 
enhancing relative rural real 
estate asset values, 
particularly the value of rural 
residential assets. This has 
occurred in the context of an 
employment structure which, 
due to the thinness of labour 
markets and the consequent 
mismatch between skills and 
available occupations, 
biases wage levels 
downwards. Housing then 
becomes unaffordable for 
residents, especially at the 
point of new household 
formation (Cloke et al., 2000; 
Milbourne and Cloke, 2013). 
This spatial failure of labour 
and housing markets 
diminishes private sector 
employment and makes the 
level of public sector 
employment appear 
relatively high. To maintain a 
roughly equal level of service 
provision, though, the 
absolute size of the rural 
state does not reflect bloating 
and inefficiency, as the 
discourse of austerity might 
imply; nevertheless, the 
effect of austerity policies 
adds a further twist to 
pressures on housing, 
employment and reduced 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
 24 
 
prospects for a dynamic rural 
development. Eight years of 
below inflation public sector 
pay increases, in rural areas 
that disproportionately 
depend on central and local 
government employment 
(e.g. in 2018 Ceredigion has 
31.4% of its employed 
population in the public 
sector, compared with 27.1% 
in Wales as whole and 21.5% 
in the United Kingdom1) have 
had a dramatic impact on 
real rural purchasing power. 
On pragmatic grounds, these 
arguments suggest that there 
is a case for at least some 
state intervention to achieve 
territorial justice. In the 
longer term, there are many 
issues that could better be 
managed with an enhanced 
rural-urban balance of 
opportunity: managing 
demographic change in the 
countryside, relief of urban 
congestion pressures, and 
reduced rural tourism 
impacts, to identify just a few. 
The barrier to achieving such 
resolution appears to be an 
absence of effective 
championing of the case for 
policy intervention. 
As noted at the beginning of 
this section, the Wales Rural 
Development Programme 
currently devotes a very 
small proportion of its 
expenditure to anything other 
than Glastir, the agri-
environment scheme. Of the 
non-agricultural elements, 
the LEADER programme 
which promotes participatory 
action for local rural 
development and small 
additions for enhancing rural 
broadband and village 
renewal, amount in total to 
less than 5% of Pillar 2 
spending. It is paradoxical 
and perplexing that the 
LEADER programme, which 
despite some setbacks 
(Granberg et al., 2016) has 
been the most effective in 
generating impacts, is given 
such a relatively small share 
of the budget. This could be 
a result of the malign 
influence of the 
Fontainebleau Agreement, 
providing the UK with a 
rebate on the difference 
between its contributions to 
and receipts from the 
European Union budget. The 
consequence is that, the 
more expenditure there is on 
European programmes, the 
less of a rebate there will be, 
and so the Treasury has 
been particularly reluctant to 
sanction discretionary 
elements of this type. A 
thriving portfolio of LEADER 
projects could have 
generated a strong advocacy 
constituency for the Welsh 
countryside, but several 
decades of under-funding 
and relentless requirements 
for reinvention have 
diminished that potential. 
After 2019, there will be two 
relevant changes. The 
Fontainebleau rebate will no 
longer constrain rural 
spending; conversely, 
though, the requirement to 
use a set proportion of rural 
development funding for 
LEADER projects will no 
longer apply. How these two 
forces interact is by no 
means clear, but the 
likelihood of less rather than 
more spending on effective 
rural development policies is 
a possibility that should be 
envisaged.  
Four principles for rural 
development policy 
The arguments of the 
preceding sections should 
bolster the capacity for 
improved rural advocacy. 
This penultimate section 
suggests the four main 
principles on which a post-
Brexit rural development 
policy in Wales could be 
based. Drawing on the 
chronologically dynamic 
perspective of spatial socio-
economic change, the first of 
these is that any intervention 
should be knowledge-based. 
It should require a clear, 
coherent understanding of 
specific local rural dynamics 
and dimensions, leading to 
locally-adapted interventions 
which the LEADER 
Programme attempted to 
facilitate. Following from this, 
and requiring that the first 
principle is satisfied, the 
second principle requires 
participation. As much power 
as possible should be 
devolved to as low a level of 
spatial disaggregation as is 
possible. It is paradoxical 
that the LEADER 
Programme was initially not 
meant to be participatory 
(Midmore, 1998), but in its 
first incarnation (apart from 
the few instances where local 
government was in control 
from the start) that 
experimental dimension 
proved to be the most useful 
and effective approach (Ray, 
2000). Only when the flavour 
of participation was 
introduced as a hallmark of 
subsequent extensions of the 
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policy did local authority 
control – in the United 
Kingdom at least – make 
LEADER just another grant 
giver for schemes requiring 
the full panoply of EU 
application bureaucracy.  
In general terms, windfall 
concentration of assets, 
chiefly housing, in the post-
war baby-boom generation 
(Hoolachan and McKee, 
2018) seem to have driven 
population dynamics outside 
of urban areas, resulting in a 
process of spatial 
demographic redistribution. 
Local structures of power 
and governance – especially 
where ventures of this kind 
are vulnerable to hijacking by 
middle class elites – should 
be considered in policy 
design, to ensure that spatial 
justice is not subverted by 
capture by sectional 
interests. A strong 
participatory dimension 
provides the best shield 
against the rural 
development myths and the 
most hope of effective and 
locally-adapted innovation.  
The third principle is that 
policy interventions should 
be designed for the long 
term. Recognising that rural 
milieu are not static, the base 
of knowledge invoked in the 
first principle needs time to 
evolve, and it takes time for 
this to accumulate. 
Participatory effectiveness 
which fulfils the second 
principle is similarly 
accumulative. This principle 
could be the hardest to 
defend as Brexit is likely to 
produce more concentrated 
and deeper shifts in policy 
than so far experienced in 
modern times, particularly in 
the framework for agricultural 
and rural affairs; more, even, 
than accession to the EU in 
1973.  
Sustained interventions are 
also difficult to support 
across changes of 
administration along the 
electoral cycle, and the even 
more frequent intra-
administration changes of 
policy emphasis due to 
turnover of the responsible 
ministers. To achieve a 
stable policy environment, 
the experience of the fixed-
term environmental contracts 
with farmers that overlap 
policy regimes could be 
instructive, committing future 
administrations to continue 
with existing policy but giving 
scope for long-term 
adjustment.  
The main question would be 
the identity of the contractor, 
and how such an entity could 
be held to account for 
fulfilling the contractual 
obligation. Voluntary 
associations, the mainstay of 
participatory rural 
development, are fragile in all 
respects apart from the 
social capital that they can 
accrue. Local government is 
a fine institution (Font and 
Galais, 2011), but its 
conventions and practices 
are antithetical to genuine 
and effective participation. 
This is an important issue for 
experimentation, and 
consequently the sooner the 
process is set in motion the 
better the prospects for 
improving spatial justice. It 
could take two full Assembly 
terms just to generate the 
necessary momentum for full 
parity of opportunity between 
rural and urban Welsh 
citizens. This process would 
require support for 
establishment, review, 
redesign and inception of 
projects that make use of 
local knowledge to adapt 
public support to the wide 
variety or rural contexts. 
Policy planning to account for 
political processes requires 
guile and determination. 
The fourth and final principle, 
effective evaluation, 
guarantees appropriate and 
accurate assessment of 
outcomes. The least-missed 
element of European policy 
will surely be the Common 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Framework (CMEF). This 
overly prescriptive, under-
resourced set of procedures 
has led to shallow and 
ineffective understanding of 
the underlying spatial-
economic processes, and 
much wasted opportunity for 
learning from experience. 
Perversely, the outcome of 
the CMEF has been 
repeated policy mistakes, 
rather than a dynamic 
stockpiling of new and 
deeper insights. 
LEADER in Wales, despite 
its shortcomings, has offered 
the opportunity to develop 
participatory approaches to 
rural development. However, 
evaluation which exploits this 
participatory dimension is not 
all well developed. Two 
aspects are very important: 
self-evaluation, which sets 
out to determine what 
happened and why; and peer 
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evaluation, which allows the 
lessons of the mistakes of 
other initiatives to be learned 
without paying for their costs. 
Such procedures cannot, 
however, be implemented 
without skilled and sensitive 
support, which calibrates the 
interests of experts and 
practitioners perceptively 
between guidance, which is 
desirable, and direction, 
which is disadvantageous to 
genuine participatory 
engagement. 
Conclusions 
The lessons that emerge 
from this discussion appear 
easy to draw but much more 
difficult to implement. 
Economic development 
processes are not aspatial, 
however uncomfortable that 
may be to the standard 
neoclassical economist. 
More knowledge about how 
these processes occur would 
result in better policies. Yet 
the gap between these 
simple insights and the policy 
mindset could not be more 
starkly expressed than in the 
Welsh Government 
consultation on post-Brexit 
policy (2018). It fails, 
noticeably, to mention spatial 
diversity, nor the role of 
inequity in driving patterns of 
economic change in the 
countryside, and implicitly 
assumes that the interests of 
farming are preeminent in the 
economic functioning of the 
countryside. Its twin pillars 
reflect the old division of the 
CAP. Aid for investment is to 
replace basic income 
payments, even though 
many farms, driven by tax 
regimes, are already 
overcapitalised (Guan et al, 
2009). The balance of policy 
will shift to support for 
ecosystem services 
production, despite notorious 
difficulties in outcome 
measurement (Bateman and 
Balmford, 2018). The non-
agricultural part of rural 
economic activity, so often 
an afterthought in the 
implementation of the EU 
CAP, appears to have been 
forgotten completely. Thus, 
as realistic and desirable an 
informed and effective rural 
advocacy might be, there is 
clearly a long road to travel 
before it is achieved. 
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